当前位置:网站首页>5000 word analysis: the way of container security attack and defense in actual combat scenarios
5000 word analysis: the way of container security attack and defense in actual combat scenarios
2022-06-26 15:47:00 【Trail safety】
In this critical period of digital transformation , The cloud native technology represented by container relies on its own advantages , Is becoming the core IT infrastructure . Cloud primordial is no longer a minority “ innovator ” The privilege of , Instead, it has become the mainstream choice in the market , Containers 、 Container cloud is becoming the mainstream form of workload .
With this , There are a lot of new technologies in the cloud , It also brings many unknown risk exposures , The objects of security protection have also undergone disruptive changes , Containers are becoming a new drill ground for hackers .
In the age of containers , Security faces the dual challenges of old and new threats . One side , Those traditional and old attacks are still effective , Including exploit 、 Brute force 、 Privilege promotion, etc . On the other hand , New attack postures are emerging one after another , For example, poisoning image 、 Vessel escape 、 colony API Call, etc , It's impossible to defend .
In the past offensive and defensive drills , There have been many cases against containers 、 Cluster attack events . Containers bring new risk exposures , It gives attackers many opportunities to take advantage of .
Why do containers become the key targets of hackers ? The author believes that the core reasons are as follows 6 In terms of :
The safety construction of containers lags behind
Although containers can be implemented more flexibly 、 Lower cost software development and application deployment , However, the corresponding container security construction lags far behind the speed of business development , A lot of “ streaking ” The container becomes the target of the attacker “ The bestselling ”.
The attack value of containers is high
In a container cluster , Just capture a container , It can be moved laterally to other containers , Or escape to node Persistent on nodes , Control the entire node . next step , Attackers can also exploit or invoke API SERVER Control the whole cluster . Cluster is a centralized system , Once lost , The defenders “ Blood strip ” A big reduction is inevitable .
The attack surface of the container is huge
In addition to the attacks introduced by the vulnerability of the application itself , colony 、 The vulnerability of the container itself can not be ignored . For example, an attacker passes through k8s、docker Unauthorized access to long drive in ; The cluster permissions are not configured properly , An attacker can create a high authority container to escape ; utilize Linux kernel cgroups modular (CVE-2022-0492) Escape .
The vulnerability of the container affects a wide range
In the traditional operation mode , The deployed software is updated on the host on which it is running , The container must be updated in the upstream image , And then redeploy . therefore , If there is a problem with the image or the underlying image , Will affect at least one or more clusters .
The protection of containers is very difficult
Container security needs to cover container construction 、 Deploy 、 Run the entire lifecycle , The links and process links involved are very complex . for example , In the build phase , Possible software supply chain attacks , Including basic image pollution 、CI Tool attack 、 Product library vulnerability attack, etc . In the deployment phase, you may also face attacks against cloud native infrastructure platforms , Including open source component orchestration tools . In the runtime phase , It may also face attacks against cloud native applications , Include SQL Inject 、 Loophole 、 Weak password, etc .
It is difficult to trace the source of container attacks
Containers have a short life cycle , Fast dynamic change , exceed 50% The entire life cycle of the container from on-line to off shelf shall not exceed 1 God . How to detect an abnormal intrusion event , Fast security response , Minimizing the loss has become a major security problem .
In the traditional security protection category , The organization's “ Endpoint 、 The Internet 、 The border ”, Each level is relatively clear , But in the cloud native environment, these boundaries disappear .
In recent years , Although the safety construction investment of enterprise organizations has increased significantly , Enterprise organizations have deployed basic firewalls 、 Leakage and 、 Terminal security and other conventional security equipment .
But when the container is under attack , Traditional safety protection means , Can not effectively protect the container . for example , stay IT Architecture , If container is included 、K8S And other new cloud native infrastructure . A simple example , An attacker can easily complete an attack in many ways . A small vulnerability may penetrate the container node , Even the whole cluster .
First step : Attack containers through container applications
Through weblogic Remote code execution vulnerability (CVE-2021-2382), Gained control of a container .
The second step : Attack other containers by collapsing containers
After gaining control of the container , It can be done by nmap And other network detection methods to find accessible container ports .
The third step : Attack the host through the container
if docker、containered Container escape vulnerability exists , This vulnerability can be exploited to gain control of the host .
Step four : Attack the cluster through the container
if K8S There is 8080、6443 Unauthorized access , Can be accessed through the container K8S master api Make malicious calls .
Just imagine , In the face of such an attack , Whether it's a boundary firewall , It is also a terminal security product , Can not complete effective safety protection , Nor can you isolate the container or kill the malicious processes in the container , Moreover, effective traceability analysis cannot be provided , The impact can only be mitigated through offline business , But this does not solve the security problem of containers from the root .
In this context , Ivy League is based on the experience of many years of practical attack and defense drills , Continuously upgrade the iteration scheme , Officially launched the upgraded version 《 Practical solutions for container security V2.0》, Interested readers can scan the code to get the electronic version .

Scan and download 《 Practical solutions for container security V2.0》
The scheme covers several core links , Include Attack risk assessment 、 Risk convergence rectification 、 Attack behavior monitoring 、 Attack event response 、 The traceability analysis report consists of five links , It can realize the active defense effect of the whole life cycle of the container .

chart 1: Attack and defense drill 5 There are two core links
The first stage : Container attack risk assessment
In the early stage of the attack and defense drill , The most important thing is to make a good attack risk assessment , Including asset sorting 、 Vulnerability check 、 Baseline check 、 Weak password check, etc . The most important thing is to do a good job in sorting out assets .
According to the experience of past attack and defense practice , Many organizations do not have enough control over their own assets , As a result, some assets were not included in effective monitoring , Formed a weak point of protection .
The attack team before launching the attack , We will collect these weak points first , And take this as a springboard to attack the key systems of the enterprise . therefore , Evaluate the assets in advance , Convergence of the exposed attack surface becomes particularly important .
Workload Visualization , Eliminate container asset blind spots
In the cloud native environment , The defender must count the container assets in the early stage of the exercise , In particular, sort out intranet clusters & Non cluster managed system assets , And map assets to people . The most important thing is to have a deep perspective on the core business assets , Especially the target system 、 Centralized system, etc .
With the above detailed asset Kanban , In the event of an intrusion , You can quickly reverse query container business applications , Assist in locating the entry point and impact area of the intrusion . for example , Before an attacker takes advantage of 0day/1day When there's a leak , Defenders can pass application level asset screening , Analyze the scope of the existing business affected by the vulnerability .

chart 2: Focus on container asset classes
Besides , You also need to sort out the application assets in the container , Discover corner systems and obsolete assets 、 Non compliant assets found , Pave the way for subsequent system reinforcement and emergency response . This process needs to focus on three aspects :
(1) Sort out the boundary between cluster and external system
First , Sort out the external exposure services of the cluster , If host network exposure service is used , Use nodeport Exposure Services . secondly , Sort out the external visits within the cluster , Non compliant external visits are found .
(2) Sort out high power 、 Privileged container
It mainly includes Privileged Privileged container 、 high Capabilities The container of 、 A container that mounts sensitive directories 、Root Container for account numbers 、Host Container for mode operation 、 Shared host namespace The container of 、 Containers for shared host devices 、CPU/ Containers with unlimited memory usage, etc .
(3) Non compliant applications found
It is mainly aimed at ssh、sudo、ftp、vsftp And so on .
Fine-grained sorting of supply chain software components , Do a good job in software management
Through fine-grained inventory of assets , It can also realize the security control of the supply chain . For business organizations , The safety of container product supply chain is also very important . Especially as cloud native application products become more and more diversified , Like a container mirror 、 helm charts They are all common product formats .
One side , It is necessary to ensure the security of the product in the application construction stage ; On the other hand, we need to store WIP ; Establish corresponding compliance checks at the time of distribution and deployment 、 Access control , Security scanning 、 Audit and access 、 Check out mechanism , Ensure the safety of the source of the product .
therefore , Before the attack and defense drill , The asset account of the software supply chain should be kept , Including running applications 、 middleware 、 database 、 Installation package 、 Framework language pack (java、go、ruby、nodejs、python、php) etc. , Find its installation path 、 Version information and configuration .

chart 3: Sinomenine honeycomb can finely comb the software components of the supply chain
The second stage : Container risk convergence reinforcement
In the attack and defense drill , Early preparation includes vulnerability rectification 、 Vulnerability mitigation 、 Target aircraft reinforcement and rectification 、 Centralized system monitoring, etc . We can summarize these technical work into two directions: risk convergence and security reinforcement . For the defender , For cloud native risk convergence reinforcement , You can sort out the system vulnerability & Rectification 、 Micro isolation and reinforcement can realize risk convergence and security reinforcement .
Vessel vulnerability assessment and rectification
Before the attack and defense drill , It is necessary to comprehensively investigate the hidden dangers of intranet security , Find and assist in rectifying the vulnerability of the container environment . There are various ways to fix vulnerabilities that may be exploited by attackers , Strengthen system security configuration , Increase the difficulty of attacker intrusion , Improve the level of security . It converges with the attack surface 、 Bug repair 、 Security policy optimization and other work have formed a complete risk management closed loop .

chart 4: Runtime vulnerability assessment & Rectification
But under the high-intensity attack in the attack and defense drill , Even if we have done a good job of risk convergence and reinforcement in the early stage , There may still be some 0day/1day High risk vulnerability , Cause the situation to be broken .
therefore , Enterprise organizations need security vendors with professional vulnerability researchers and vulnerability emergency response processes , In the 24 Within hours , Provide emergency response plan . Once the intelligence with high-risk loopholes is found during the exercise , Need to follow up as soon as possible . Sinomeni has a very sound emergency response team and a perfect response process , It can well deal with the container safety emergency disposal under the background of actual combat .
chart 5: Sinomenine vulnerability emergency response and disposal process
Micro isolation control of key systems
In actual combat confrontation , It can be predicted that the attacker will launch a high-intensity long-range attack on the exercise target system . Without limiting the attack path , To control the business system 、 The ultimate goal is to obtain important data , Full scale attack . Therefore, the defender needs to micro isolate and control the important systems in the early stage of the exercise , It mainly includes two aspects :
foreign , It is necessary to sort out the boundary between container clusters and external systems , Sort out the services exposed by the cluster and the external access within the cluster , Conduct compliance control .
internal , It is necessary to sort out the important systems in the container ( The cluster system 、 Target system ) Access model in Intranet , Form an access control baseline .

chart 6: Micro isolation control of key systems
The third stage : Container attack behavior monitoring
After the attack and defense drill , The red team followed the attacker's thinking , Initiate high intensity 、 High level cyber attacks . therefore , For the blue team , Monitoring is a crucial step to be able to detect attacks in a timely manner . Ivy honeycomb can provide multi anchor detection capability , Can real-time 、 Accurately perceive intrusion events , Found lost container .

chart 7: Multi anchor monitoring covering the attack link
Container attack event monitoring
Although preventive security technology can deal with known signature based threats , But the blue team still needs network security monitoring to identify more complex threats .
therefore , The defender needs to take advantage of the host deployed in the early stage 、 Container attack monitoring system , Discover attacks in real time , And report according to the attack alarm monitoring process . In addition to being able to detect threats with known characteristics , It can also detect malicious behavior , It can also perform anomaly detection .

chart 8: Ivy honeycomb three-dimensional intrusion monitoring system
(1) Threat detection based on known characteristics
Ivy honeycomb can be used for documents in containers 、 Code 、 Scripts, etc. to detect known features , The virus in the container can be found in real time 、 dig 、webshell And other known threats . With webshell For example , Green rattan thunder fire is based on AI Reasoning found that Webshell Suspicious content in , Its Webshell The detection rate exceeds the highest level in history , the height is 99.99%, And the whole use process does not need long-term training , Plug and play .

chart 9: Known threat detection
(2) Detection based on malicious behavior
Ivy honeycomb , Based on the definition of malicious behavior patterns , It can detect the hacker attacks of containers and orchestration tools in real time .
First , No file attacks can be detected in the container , Support memory discovery webshell、shellcode And loading dynamic link libraries and other memory codes .
secondly , Container escape behavior can be detected , Support discovery K8S Component vulnerability escape 、 Kernel vulnerability escape 、 Container vulnerability escape 、 Sensitive mount and escape .
Last , Can be detected K8S API A malicious act , Support includes anonymous user login 、secrets obtain 、API server Suspicious operation, etc .
chart 10: Key malicious behavior detection
(3) Detection based on abnormal behavior Ivy honeycomb , Can be applied to processes in the container 、 Network and other behaviors to learn and build models , So as to find abnormal intrusion .
For important container target 、 Cluster system to learn in advance , Form a stable model , Once an exception is found, the process starts 、 Abnormal port listening 、 Abnormal network connection and abnormal file operation will alarm immediately .

chart 11: Unknown threat detection
Handling container attacks
In the detection of ⼊ After the invasion , For collapsible containers, it is necessary to enter ⾏ Fast security response , Minimize the loss . Ivy honeycomb can implement different fine-grained control measures , It can be isolated directly at the container level 、 Pause 、 Kill the container , At the container behavior level, processes can be blocked 、 Isolate files 、 Prohibition IP, No problem workloads are allowed to access or be accessed .
Intrusion rules continue to operate
Ivy vine has collected information about the new invasion posture in the process of attack and defense , It can quickly respond and generate system rules , Enhance the product intrusion detection capability through rule updating .
at present , The latest product features of ivy bee nest , Already has custom Threat Intelligence and detection capabilities . for example , The front-line personnel of the user find the intrusion information disclosed during the attack and defense drill , It is available through the product Custom anchor detection rules and custom Threat Intelligence , Enhance the intrusion detection capability of supplementary products .
The fourth stage : Container attack event response
Once the authenticity of the alarm is determined , The security expert should pass the host 、 Logs on the container and system alarms , Investigate the attack , And generate 《XXX Incident investigation report 》. above all 2 One aspect is : Check the lost area 、 The attack process is restored .
Container attack process restore
Through the analysis and tracing of the attacked assets , Restore attack path and attack technique , Users can not only effectively improve the effect of attack and defense drill , It can also enhance the normalized security defense capability , Convert... Into potential attack , Avoid secondary attacks .

chart 12: The attack process is restored
Troubleshooting of vessel collapse range
Find a confirmed lost host according to the existing information / Container information , Then take the data of the lost host and its interconnection as a clue , Expand intranet traceability in the user system , Confirm whether there is a host penetrated laterally / Containers , And cycle the process , Step by step find out all the lost hosts / Containers , Confirm the impact area of the attack and the specific loss range , Remove the attack team from the intranet .
chart 13: Scope of investigation
The fifth stage : Container traceability analysis report
Ivy honeycomb , You can collect container related behavior data , Include API Call behavior log 、 Container process events 、 Container network events 、 Container file Events 、k8s Audit log events, etc , combination ATT&CK Framework model , Use big data tools to analyze security threats , Determine the impact scope and intrusion path of the attack , Actively discover other internal potential threats through threat hunting .
The defender confirmed the investigation after completing the attack 、 After restoring the whole process , Need to sort out a defense report , Explain the authenticity of the attack 、 The coverage of the attack 、 Attacker's attack path and behavior , And submit the report to the Organizer .

chart 14: Form a defensive report
As mentioned earlier , Containers have become an important target for hackers , But at present, there is a great lack of effective security measures . Foreseeable , Future containers 、 Container clustering will become the most important IT infrastructure . No matter in the real network battle , Or in the relevant offensive and defensive exercises , The cloud native infrastructure represented by the container will be a must for both offensive and defensive sides .
If you have any questions about attack and defense drills or container security , Welcome to call 400-188-9287 turn 1, Or scan the QR code directly below , receive 《 Practical solutions for container security V2.0》. You can also click “ Read the original ” Apply for a free trial Sinomenine container safety products ~

Scan and download 《 Practical solutions for container security V2.0》
边栏推荐
- Nanopi duo2 connection WiFi
- JVM笔记
- 学习内存屏障
- [CEPH] cephfs internal implementation (IV): how is MDS started-- Undigested
- 2022北京石景山区专精特新中小企业申报流程,补贴10-20万
- NFT交易原理分析(2)
- Summary of data interface API used in word search and translation applications
- NFT transaction principle analysis (1)
- 【leetcode】331. 验证二叉树的前序序列化
- 5000字解析:实战化场景下的容器安全攻防之道
猜你喜欢

【毕业季·进击的技术er】 什么是微信小程序,带你推开小程序的大门

【TcaplusDB知识库】TcaplusDB单据受理-创建游戏区介绍

效率超级加倍!pycharm十个小技巧就是这么神

Solana扩容机制分析(1):牺牲可用性换取高效率的极端尝试 | CatcherVC Research

Reflection modification final

Particle filter PF - 3D CV target tracking with uniform motion (particle filter vs extended Kalman filter)

AbortController的使用

How to handle 2gcsv files that cannot be opened? Use byzer

sqlite加载csv文件,并做数据分析
![[CEPH] Lock Notes of cephfs](/img/9a/b68e7b07b1187794c0dbed36eea749.png)
[CEPH] Lock Notes of cephfs
随机推荐
手机上怎么开户?在线开户安全么?
Selenium chrome disable JS disable pictures
安全Json协议
面试高频 | 你追我赶的Flink双流join
Use of abortcontroller
【leetcode】48. Rotate image
AUTO sharding policy will apply DATA sharding policy as it failed to apply FILE sharding policy
Don't remove custom line breaks on reformat
A blog to thoroughly master the theory and practice of particle filter (PF) (matlab version)
NFT 平台安全指南(2)
High frequency interview 𞓜 Flink Shuangliu join
js创意图标导航菜单切换背景色
评价——TOPSIS
全面解析Discord安全问题
feil_ The working directory on the left of uvission4 disappears
selenium将元素保存为图片
简单科普Ethereum的Transaction Input Data
Comparative analysis of restcloud ETL and kettle
JS之简易deepCopy(简介递归)
NFT 平台安全指南(1)

